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Surveillance of Islamic
Communities in the U.S.
T. Cameron Swathwood
Surveillance of Islamic communities in the
United States has become a controversial
issue in recent years. This article examines
the reasons offered for the legitimacy of such
surveillance, specifically the historical
precedent and inherent beliefs associated
with the Islamic worldview and the legal and
practical considerations thereof. Finally, it
examines the real-world implications and
functions of surveillance like that practiced
by the New York City Police Department in
the aftermath of 9/11.
In 2011, it came to light that the New York
City Police Department had engaged in
investigation and surveillance of local
mosques, Islamic organizations, and
communities
throughout
the
city.
Subsequent evidence, some as recent as
2013, revealed that this surveillance had
begun shortly after the attacks on 9/11. It
consisted of measures like mapping of
Muslim communities, businesses, and
religious, educational, and social institutions.
Furthermore, the NYPD deployed officers
and informants to infiltrate mosques and
monitor the conversations of congregants
and religious leaders. Online postings were
also monitored while information collected
from these activities was entered into
intelligence
databases.
Surveillance
extended further to monitoring and
investigating specific people who were
perceived as respected or influential in the
Islamic community.79
Reaction to these revelations was swift
and mostly negative. Regardless, a crucial
question was neglected: Was this
surveillance, and other surveillance like it,
warranted? An open-minded review of the
facts shows that this surveillance and
investigation framework seems reasonable,
as a Muslim community is more likely to
Hina Shamsi, “Raza v. City of New York,” American
Civil Liberties Union, accessed September 2, 2013,
79

https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/nypd_su
rveillance_complaint_-_final_06182013_1.pdf.
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produce a terrorist for two primary reasons.
The first of two subpoints here is historical
precedent. Anti-American violence from
assorted Muslim groups has been a factor of
the status quo since the 1970s, to say
nothing of the destruction wrought against a
variety of other opponents. The second
subpoint is the violence inherent in the
Islamic worldview. As unpopular as it is to
speak in such a manner in this day and age,
the unfortunate fact is that Islam, when
followed to its logical extent, demands a
violent slaughter of all those who believe
otherwise. This will be examined in greater
detail later, as will the obvious fact that
clearly not all Muslims choose to become
violent. As the second main point, it is
therefore not unreasonable to posit that
those who hold to and attempt to order their
lives by way of an ideology that promotes
violence and seeks to destroy that which
opposes it should be watched with greater
scrutiny than those who do not. This article
will examine both of these points in turn, in
addition to legal and practical considerations
and implications of such surveillance.

explicitly Muslim. Supporting this point via an
in-depth examination of the quantity and
impact of terrorist incidents with regard to the
motivation or orientation of the attackers is
beyond the scope of this article, but a cursory
examination reveals the same conclusions.
The watershed event was clearly the
suicide attacks in September 2001, but there
have been other incidents both before and
after. For example, the two bombings in
Beirut by the Islamic Jihad Organization in
1983 killed 304 Americans,82 and the USS
Cole bombing in Yemen by al-Qaeda
operatives in October 2000 killed seventeen
sailors.83 All of these incidents and others like
them indicate an unusual and increasing
level of violence from Muslim groups.
It is worth noting at this point that while
Muslim terrorist attacks on the United States
may be outnumbered in quantity by those of
other orientations (far left-wing, far rightwing, pro-earth, etc.), they are not outdone in
the area of quality. Organizations whose
motivations for violence stem from
something other than that of Islamic terrorist
groups tend to inflict fewer casualties and
reflect less sophistication than that of Muslim
groups, according to a survey of the
University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism
Database. A query of the top twenty
deadliest terrorist attacks worldwide by
casualty rate since 1970 reveals that Islamic
groups hold three of the top five slots, and
are the only transnational ideology featured
in the top twenty.

The first reason that the Muslim Ummah
(a term referring to the super-national
worldwide Islamic community80) is more
likely to produce a terrorist is that of historical
precedent. If it can be shown that there is a
repeated, focused, and damaging campaign
of violence against the United States (to say
nothing of attacks against other countries) by
Muslim groups, then it is reasonable to
expect Muslims to be a source of potential
trouble. Since the failed triple car-bomb plot
by Khalid Al-Jawary in 1973,81 there has
been an extensive series of violent incidents
against the United States, the most
damaging committed by Muslim groups.
These groups have been united under a
series of different banners, but all have been

Center
for
Defense
Information
researcher, Mark Burgess, notes:
The modern terrorist, most particular
the religiously motivated one, [is] . . .
notably less restrained in his
methods and willingness to inflict

Encyclopedia Britannica Online, “Islam,” accessed
November
27,
2013,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/295507/Is
lam.
81 Adam Goldman and Randy Herschaft, “AP IMPACT:
Freedom Looms for Terrorist,” Associated Press,
accessed
September
2,
2013,
http://www.personal.psu.edu/glm7/m316.htm.
80
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Global Terrorism Database, GTD Identification
Numbers 198304180001 & 198310230007, University
of Maryland, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
83 Ibid., GTD Identification Number 200010120001,
GTD Identification Numbers 200912250024 &
201005010001.
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casualties than
predecessors.84

many

of

worldview’s preexisting inherent violence,
the danger is increased. The first indicator of
this point is the many violent passages in the
Koran, particularly verses like Surah 9:5,
which instructs Muslims to:

his

Continuing this line of argumentation, he
discusses al-Qaeda’s quest to obtain WMDs,
saying:

fight and slay the Pagans wherever
ye find them, and seize them,
beleaguer them, and lie in wait for
them in every stratagem (of war); but
if they repent, and establish regular
prayers and practise regular charity,
then open the way for them: for Allah
is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.86

Religious terrorists’ willingness to use
such weapons reflects a readiness
and eagerness to inflict mass
casualties that secular terrorists
would likely balk at as counterproductive. This inclination towards
higher levels of violence has
emerged as one of religious
terrorism’s defining characteristics.85

Standing in opposition to this is the fact that
most Muslims do not appear violent. On the
contrary, out of the estimated 1.5 billion
Muslims in the world today,87 most have
chosen not to engage in violence. To support
this perspective of Islam as fundamentally
nonviolent, Muslims are quick to point out the
peaceful verses in other parts of the Koran.
Unfortunately, they neglect mentioning a key
Muslim doctrine known as the doctrine of
Abrogation. Surah 2:106 says:

The situation here can be compared to
that of a sexual assault committed in a large
city. If an old man, a middle-aged woman,
and a middle-aged man are brought under
suspicion by the investigation; the police will
naturally look more closely at the middleaged man than the other suspects. This is
not a result of a preexisting bias against all
middle-aged males, but simply due to the fact
that, historically, people that fit his profile
have shown themselves more willing to
engage in conduct of the type that just
occurred. In other words, this middle-aged
man is more likely to have committed the
sexual assault due to the fact that middleaged men make up the majority of U.S.
sexual offenders. In the same manner, it
would not seem unreasonable to argue for
“keeping a closer eye” on the Muslim Ummah
due to its historic tendency to produce
particularly violent offenders.

None of Our revelations do We
abrogate or cause to be forgotten, but
We substitute something better or
similar: Knowest thou not that Allah
Hath power over all things?88
This references the primacy that more recent
surahs take over the older ones. The
problem arises when one consults a
chronological list of the Koran’s surahs and
notes that the newer Surahs are increasingly
violent, calling for proselytization and forced
conversion, presumably as the fledgling
religion gained power and popularity in the
Arab peninsula. Milder, more moderate
verses like Surah 2:256, which says:

The second reason increased attention
should be paid to Muslim communities in the
course of guarding against terrorism is the
issue of the fundamental violence of the
Islamic worldview. When the alreadyestablished fact of the amplified danger of
religious terrorist groups over their secular
counterparts is coupled with the Islamic

Let there be no compulsion in
religion: Truth stands out clear from
Error: whoever rejects evil and
The Holy Qur’an, M.H. Shakir (trans.), University of
Michigan Online Book Initiative, accessed September
2, 2013, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/k/koran/.
87 Encyclopedia Britannica Online.

Mark Burgess, “Explaining Religious Terrorism Part
1: The Axis of Good and Evil,” Agentura.Ru Studies
and Research Centre, May 20, 2004, accessed
September
2013,
http://studies.agentura.ru/centres/cdi/explaining1/.
85 Ibid.

86

84

88 Ibid.
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believes in Allah hath grasped the
most trustworthy hand-hold, that
never breaks.89

terror, the problem then is the religion itself
and the ideas therein. Since it is impossible
to fight an idea itself, which exists only in the
minds of its followers, it must be countered
by engaging its practitioners who choose to
live it out to its fullest extent. In this case, a
worldwide community of practitioners of this
religion has produced offenders who have
wrought more violence against the United
States and its allies than other violent
ideologies. Further, these practitioners hold
to an inherently violent worldview, one that is
based on subjugation. The odds, then, are
simply higher that future terrorists will be
found in a Muslim community. That which is
nearest and dearest to every Muslim’s hearts
(their faith) demands that they wage jihad,
and as such, they seem more likely to do so
than someone who has no such powerful
internal stimulus pressuring him to violence.
It is therefore not unreasonable to watch a
worldwide community and its local
concentrations for trouble when that
community has shown itself prone to
violence and holds to a forceful worldview
which pushes its practitioners towards
terrorist action. As such, it appears apparent
that surveillance such as that practiced by
the NYPD is reasonable.

and was written 87th out of 114, have been
abrogated and replaced by verses like the
previously mentioned Surah 9:5, which was
written 113th. Violence trumps peace in the
Koran.
Another point on the issue of inherent
violence and therefore increased danger in
Islam is the fact that Islam is not merely a
religious faith, but rather a worldview system
with sweeping implications for all of life.
Iranian refugee Azam Kamguian writes:
In countries ruled by Islamic law and
where political Islam holds sway,
writers,
thinkers,
philosophers,
activists, and artists are frequently
denied freedom of expression.
Islamic regimes are notorious for the
violent suppression of free thought.
Often, as a government allies itself
closely with Islam, any critics of the
government will be accused of
blasphemy or apostasy.90
These troubling manifestations in domestic
governance, coupled with the disturbing
nature and perception of Islamic Sharia
law,91 mark Islam as more than a simple
religion, and indicate it deserves closer
observation. Secular terrorist groups
generally have as their motivation nothing
more than a seat at the table in deciding how
things are done in the status quo. However,
religiously-motivated Islamic terrorists intend
to destroy the table, everyone else at it, and
the status quo itself, to paraphrase R. James
Woolsey.92

In the abstract, the surveillance is
reasonable, but in the concrete, it may still
face obstacles. In the United States, citizens
enjoy a variety of rights and legal protections
that would seem to prohibit the government
from
an
uninhibited
campaign
of
surveillance,
investigation,
and
counterterrorist action. Increased scrutiny of
Muslims appears sensible, but the legal
questions still remain.
A preliminary note should be addressed.
Very rarely in the so-called legal discussions

As Islam appears to be an ideology that
influences individuals to commit acts of
89

Ibid.
Azam Kamguian, IHEU, “The Fate of Infidels and
Apostates under Islam”, International Humanist and
Ethical Union, accessed September 2, 2013,
http://iheu.org/content/fate-infidels-and-apostatesunder-islam-0.
91 Kevin Bywater, “Liberty or Islamic Law?” Summit
Oxford Study Centre, June 28, 2013, accessed
September
2,
2013,

http://www.summit.org/blogs/summitannouncements/liberty-or-islamic-law/.
92 R. James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence
(fmr.), “Countering the Changing Threat of
International Terrorism,” August 2, 2000, accessed
September
2,
2013,
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPOCOUNTERINGTERRORISM/pdf/GPOCOUNTERINGTERRORISM-1-3.pdf.

90
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of this matter do actual references to the law
or serious legal dialogue occur. In its place is
reasoning like that used by the American
Civil Liberties Union, which is leading the
legal charge with a class-action lawsuit
against the NYPD. The ACLU repeatedly
says in its court complaint that the main
problem the courts should have with the
NYPD’s surveillance program is that it is
done “because of [the plaintiffs’] religious
beliefs and practices.”93 Specifically, they
object to how in preliminary studies the
NYPD
conducted
before
beginning
surveillance, they specifically set aside other
religions (for example, distinguishing
between the American-Egyptian Muslim
community and the American-Egyptian
Coptic Christian community) in order to focus
in on the Islamic community.

goings-on, etc.) only when they had specific
information that a crime had been committed
or was imminent. Undercover officers could
be used only when necessary to a case, not
as a way to subtly keep tabs on groups that
that may pose a threat in the future. In
addition, police were prohibited from building
dossiers on people or keeping their names in
files without specific evidence of crimes.95 In
the days after 9/11, believing a change was
needed, the NYPD formally requested that
the federal court system do away with the
Handschu rules. Matt Apuzzo and Adam
Goldman write,
The judge presiding over the
Handschu case, Charles Haight . . .
did away with the requirement that
the NYPD launch investigations only
when it had specific evidence that a
crime was being committed. And he
eliminated the rule that police could
use undercover officers in political
investigations only when they were
essential. Most important for the
secretly planned Demographics Unit,
Haight ruled: ‘For the purpose of
detecting or preventing terrorist
activities, the NYPD is authorized to
visit any place and attend any event
that is open to the public on the same
terms and conditions as members of
the public generally.96

The other key issue organizations like the
ACLU (and the 125-group coalition that
supports their lawsuit)94 take issue with in the
NYPD surveillance is that it watches and
records conduct that is not illegal, and has
not averted a single terrorist attack.
However, they again ignore the fact that the
Islamic faith appears to be a historically and
inherently violent worldview. What defense
can there be against something like this
other than to watch its practitioners to see
when the next terrorist plot will materialize?
Further, they fail to point to any specific law
that prohibits law enforcement from doing
this.

In terms of the Handschu rules, which appear
to be the only legal precedent in this arena,
the NYPD’s conduct is legally acceptable.

The main legal issue in play, then, seems
to be the legality of law enforcement
surveillance in the absence of an alreadycommitted crime or reasonable suspicion
thereof. Previously, the NYPD played under
a set of legal guidelines known as the
Handschu rules. These guidelines stated
that police could investigate constitutionally
protected activities (speech, religious

The key question remains: Is this
surveillance legal?
The answer
is
multifaceted. First, there is no law declaring
it to be so, and no court has ruled that it is. In
fact, what appears to be the only legal
precedent available on the issue (the
aforementioned Handschu rules revision)
indicates this surveillance is perfectly legal.

93 Shamsi,

“Raza v. City of New York.”
Noa Yachot, “125 Groups ask DOJ to Probe UnAmerican NYPD Surveillance,” American Civil Liberties
Union,
accessed
September
2,
2013,
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-religionbelief-technology-and-liberty/125-groups-ask-dojprobe-un-american.

Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, “The NYPD
Division of Un-American Activities,” New York
Magazine, August 25, 2013, accessed September 2,
2013,
http://nymag.com/news/features/nypddemographics-unit-2013-9/.
96 Ibid.
95

94
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As such, in one sense it is legal simply
because it has not been declared to not be
so. There is another aspect to this question,
though, and it is the spirit in which most ask
it: Should this surveillance be legal?
However, attempting to answer this question
by offering a legal opinion in this murky
context is beyond the scope and authority of
this article and author.

seeking to immigrate might not be an issue,
but a practicing Muslim from Yemen would
be, as that particular country has a high level
of terrorist activity at this time. A secularist
seeking a degree in nuclear engineering
might not be important, but a practicing
Muslim doing the same could be grounds for
quiet investigation and surveillance, to assist
in the preclusion of the AQ Khans of the
future. Being a member of a more
fundamentalist Muslim sect (Wahhabism or
Qutbism, for example) could also be grounds
for concern. In an example of multiple
stressors, a practicing Muslim (first stressor)
with anti-American sentiments (second) from
a hostile country like Iran (third) seeking
postgraduate
education
in
chemical
engineering (fourth) could be grounds for
strong concern. In this way, surveillance and
investigation could be appropriately and
proportionately applied where needed most.

The facts, then, seem to indicate two main
points. First, Islam appears to be a
historically and inherently violent faith that
has shown a tendency to motivate its
followers to violence. Second, surveillance
therefore appears to be both reasonable and
legal. As such, the final section of this article
will seek to address the practical implications
of the points made therein.
Since most Muslims are not terrorists,
courses of action such as open hostilities
against or declaring war on the entire
Ummah are morally reprehensible and out of
the question, not to mention cost-prohibitive
and
inefficient.
Surveillance
and
investigation would be the more appropriate
measure, and the surveillance methods
practiced by the NYPD appear an excellent
place to start in reference to communities or
geographical concentrations of Islam in
America. Those sources cited at the
beginning of this article provide a good
overview of this surveillance. To these, it
would seem reasonable to add an additional
investigative layer; one that could focus on
the bigger picture, the fact that it is not just a
regional flavor of Islam that has a historical
and inherent predisposition to violence. This
level could seek to detect and investigate
individual Muslims on a more personal level.

As noted near the beginning of this article,
this topic is unpopular. It is also apparent that
it is a complex topic that merits more
research and analysis than it is possible for it
to receive here. Many, if not all, of the topics
addressed and points made could be
examined much better if given more space
and time. Unfortunately, to do so here would
be beyond the purview of this fairly limited
article. This article is only intended to offer a
new perspective or spark debate, not to
provide an exhaustive review and analysis of
this many-sided situation.

Specifically, a nationwide program such
as this could look for one or more personal
“stressors” that, absent an Islamic affiliation,
would be a non-issue, or at least, less of a
concern. These stressors could include
originating from a questionable country,
seeking advanced degrees, being a member
of a more fundamentalist sect, or professing
anti-American or anti-Western tendencies.
For example, a secularist from Yemen
15

